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Abstract

Now more than ever, organizations are being created to protect the
cyberspace environment. The capability of cyber organizations tasked to defend
critical infrastructure has been called into question by numerous cybersecurity
experts. Organizational theory states that organizations should be constructed to fit
their operating environment properly. Little research in this area links existing
organizational theory to cyber organizational structure. Because of the cyberspace
connection to critical infrastructure assets, the factors that influence the structure of
cyber organizations designed to protect these assets warrant analysis to identify
opportunities for improvement.
This thesis analyzes the cyber‐connected critical infrastructure environment
using the dominant organizational structure theories. By using multiple case study
and content analysis, 2,856 sampling units are analyzed to ascertain the level of
perceived uncertainty in the environment (complexity, dynamism, and
munificence). The results indicate that the general external environment of cyber
organizations tasked to protect critical infrastructure is highly uncertain thereby
meriting implementation of organic structuring principles.
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CYBERSPACE AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ENVIRONMENT

I. Introduction
Operational Motivation
In his book Blink, Gladwell [27] describes the ability to render accurate
expert judgment in situations (e.g., detecting fraudulent art or diagnosing a medical
condition) quickly without collecting and analyzing mass amounts of data. Experts
in cyber security, using techniques described by Gladwell, have declared that
governments are not prepared to respond to cyber‐attacks [5, 10, 13, 36]. These
experts, understanding critical infrastructure cyber security, inherently know that
response organizations currently in place are ill‐fit to handle a crisis that may be
right around the corner.
The organizations that are supposed to defend against these threats (e.g.,
Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Cyber Command) may not be able to
resist or recover from a persistent cyber‐attack [36, 59]. This situation is
particularly troubling because the National Security Agency’s Director stated that
several countries, including China and Russia, have the cyber capabilities to disrupt
electrical utilities throughout the United States [53]. Without necessarily analyzing
the cyber operating environment, experts fully understand the government is
modeling current cyber defense organizations after practically every other
1

government organization (e.g., rigid, slow to change, and hierarchical). Perhaps the
issues these organizations face are foundational.
As Colquitt, Lepine and Wesson state, almost everything in organizational
behavior starts with structure [16]. If security and resilience in cyberspace are a
goal, then an analysis of structure should be an initial primary consideration.
The study of organizational structure is largely a discipline within the social
sciences and championed by organizational structure theorists. Over the last fifty
years, this area of research has grown considerably. Recent theory has advanced
significantly from the division of labor analyzed by Adam Smith and Max Weber. It
appears that once stable systems are now rapidly restructuring in uncertain
emergent global markets, marked by rapid technological change and tremendous
competition.
Personal observations while assigned to the headquarters staff for an Army
organization tasked with creating a new cyber unit were enlightening. Numerous
leaders worked furiously to find out the best way to accomplish the task. Time was
limited. The pressure to be ready to defend the network was great. Attacks on
military networks were growing by the day. This situation did not allow for slow
and deliberate theoretical analysis. Rather, it created a cyber‐organization solution
whose future effectiveness was in question.
Situations like this one are happening everywhere there is a need to defend
critical cyber assets. The urgency of the circumstance creates the need for
2

immediate action. The pervasiveness of information technology and societies
increasing dependence on cyber is not likely to resolve quickly. Indeed a couple of
decades ago Ilinitch, D’Aveni and Lewin claimed about this new environment,
“Although numerous organizations are being created, few are examining the
organizational research and many are experimenting with disaster” [32]. This thesis
seeks to fill the gap in the literature to address this critical issue.

Research Questions
This thesis analyzes relevant organizational structure theory and its
connection to cyber organizations to answer the following research questions:
1. What is organizational structure?
2. What theories contribute to organizational structure?
3. How should organizations structure in cyber environments?
Methodology
The research approach is qualitative, pragmatic, and exploratory in nature,
using multiple case study and content analysis. The environment of cyber‐connected
critical infrastructure, defined as critical infrastructure that connects to cyberspace
(primarily the internet), will be evaluated from the perspective of the academic,
governmental and private/practitioner communities. Documents provide the
information for analysis. Content analysis categorizes and quantifies the level of
uncertainty in the environment.
3

Limitations
Limitations ranged from software functionality to method selection.
Significant software limitations included the lack of flexibility in software
modification, and user licenses requiring each coder to have their copy of the
software. The researcher limited the cases to the cyber‐connected critical
infrastructure environment (though the nature of cyber closely links this research
with other cyber environments), and the search engines to eight sources.
Documentation, provided by the search engines for the data set, were (in some
cases) limited; not all information on the cyber‐connected critical infrastructure
environment is available and some required subscriptions. The availability of
personnel with knowledge of the phenomena, the appropriate reading level, and
coding expertise was limited. Human coding suffered natural limitations from the
ambiguity of word meaning to fatigue. The multiple case study approach with
multiple strata was used to overcome data triangulation (multiple data collection
techniques, e.g., surveys, interviews). This research used appropriate techniques to
mitigate these limitations and others (e.g., rest, training)

Implications
Theory dictates that organizations should structure to fit their operating
environment. The insights of this analysis should help strategic cyber leaders,
particularly those tasked to protect critical infrastructure, understand critical
4

aspects of the environment. The connections made between structure and
environment will aid in structuring more effective cyber response organizations.

5

II. Literature Review
Structuring Organizations
When discussing organizational structure, it is helpful to define the meaning
of “organizational structure.” Many people, when hearing organizational structure,
will conjure up a picture of an organizational chart of some sort. However,
organizational structure encompasses far more than a chart. Organizational
structure commonly breaks into two dimensions: structural and contextual [17, 50].
These dimensions help explain the forms organizations take and why they take
them. The structural dimensions include how organizations attempt to control
behavior and complete tasks. Contextual dimensions, often called contingencies, are
forces acting within and outside the organization, which aﬀect the structural
dimensions. Table 1 displays some of the significant structural and contextual
dimensions.

6

Table 1. Structural Dimensions of Organizations

Type
Structural

Dimensions
Specialization; centralization;
formalization; span of
control; chain of command;
personal specialty.

Contextual

Size; strategy; culture;
external and internal
environment (competition,
hostility, geography);
technology.

Traits
How many tasks in a job; who has
the authority to make decisions and
where; how standardized and
explicit are the rules, policies and
procedures; how many people are
supervised in a particular group;
who reports to whom up the
hierarchy; what is everyone
required to know.
What size is the organization and its
subunits; what choices are being
made by leadership; perceived
values and beliefs; what is
happening in and around the
organization which can aﬀect it; the
presence and eﬀects of technology.

This thesis will explore these dimensions to determine their implication for
structuring organizations to operate in cyberspace. What follows is a review of the
dominant theoretical principles.

Organizational Structure Theory
The study of the existence of organizations and how to sustain that existence
has increased dramatically in the last 75 years [49]. The rise and ubiquitous nature
of information technology and its eﬀects on organizational structure theory in the
social sciences have led to proportionately rapid theory development [45]. Few
could foresee the universality and importance of technological systems. The four

7

dominant, historical theories on organizational structure are (i) institutional, (ii)
resource dependence, (iii) population ecology, and (iv) structural contingency.
Institutional Theory.
Dimaggio and Powell introduced institutional theory (or institutional
isomorphism) in 1983. The crux of this theory can be summed up rather simply –
organizations tend to mimic each other [20]. Dimaggio and Powell point to three
main types of isomorphism, which are coercive, mimetic and normative. Coercion
explains how organizations often result in similar structures because of similar
external environmental pressures (e.g., government oversight). Mimetic explains
how organizations in established fields tend to mimic each other as a bulwark
against uncertainty. Normative isomorphic processes result from the
professionalization of a field accompanied by common training, standards and
practices, which create homogeneity [20]. It is important to note, that in the cyber‐
connected critical infrastructure environment, institutional isomorphism may not
be helpful. Observation of government cyber structuring in the U.S. Department of
Defense indicates the presence of isomorphism. For example, newly created cyber
forces closely resemble traditional military forces, even though there are critical
diﬀerences in the environments of each.
Resource Dependence Theory.
Resource dependence theory argues organizational survival be about
acquiring and maintaining resources [49]. There is considerable overlap between
8

resource dependence and population ecology. However, there are several
deviations; some examples are in the roles of information processing and strategic
choice. Population ecology argues that, given certain conditions, strategic choice is
possible. However, most organizations are often powerless to choose because of
inter‐organizational dependencies and information processing issues [1]. Resource
dependence counters by oﬀering that information systems determine organizational
choice and provide critical information [49]. Understanding what constitutes a
resource in cyber is diﬃcult. However, some general examples include money and
people.
Population Ecology Theory.
Population ecology offers explanations based on the natural selection model.
Aldrich and Pfeﬀer argue in the Environment of Organizations that organizations
change because of the distribution of resources in the organization’s environment
[3]. The environment selects the organizational form, which demands a constant
sense of adaptation. The list of once successful organizations that did not adapt to
the environment and quickly found themselves obsolete is long. Government cyber
organizations can ill aﬀord to be a part of this group. A consistent theme is
developing in the alignment of the environment and the organization. Structural
adaptation and flexible structuring in high information technology industries are
now prominent.

9

Structural Contingency Theory.
This theory oﬀers a potential synthesis of ideas represented in the theories
above. Structural contingency theory declares the most eﬀective organizational
structure is the one which best “fits” the contingencies [22]. Inherent in this
definition is that structure should be tailored. Donaldson [23] states that certain
factors influence structure. These factors (known as contingency factors) include
technology, size, strategy and the environment [23, 47]. Most contingencies involve
the internal boundary of the organization, but some of the most critical are outside
of that boundary (e.g., the external environment). Contingency theory offers several
empirically verified results that show organizations that fit the contingencies
present in the environment outperform those who do not [23]. It is important to
note that rarely does an organization have to address one contingency and not
others, making radical organizational overhauls preferable to prolonged
incremental steps [51]. Heuristically, it is also desirable to make these changes
earlier in the life of an organization than later, which bodes well for cyber
organizations, as they are in their infancy.

Contingencies
Building upon contingency theory, what follows is a brief review of the
central contingencies in the research literature and their relevance to the cyber
environment.
10

Technology.
Technology and the change surrounding it increase perceived uncertainty for
organizations [55]. As uncertainty increases so does the pressure to learn and
increase knowledge. This pressure for knowledge creates new work roles,
workflows, and even changes the language used to describe work [55]. The focus is
not whether organizations will use information technology to accomplish
something, but how they will accomplish things within and around it. Cyber
organizations should keep these principles in mind, and be careful not to design
structures that are comfortable but inappropriate.
Size.
Size considerably aﬀects the type and classification of an organization [47].
Organizational size has been found to aﬀect nearly everything that defines
organizational structure. For instance, larger organizations are often more complex,
have more formalization and survive longer than smaller organizations [7].
Information technology‐rich environments have been shown to reduce organization
size as information systems replace middle management and allow other
organizations to increase in size without decreasing eﬃciency and innovativeness
[19]. It is important to note that eﬃciency has not been shown to improve as
organizational size increases [28]. Collyer [15] states that as the size of the project
increases so does the chance of failure. The likelihood of that failure is compounded
by increased speed and quantity of change in the environment. The consensus
11

appears to be forming wherein larger organizations form right‐sized subunits that
perform well when based on the relevant factors.
Strategy and Strategic Choice.
The type of strategy an organization pursues significantly aﬀects the
structure of organizations [1, 12, 23, 47]. Perhaps most importantly, when
organizations choose a strategy to match structure to the relevant contingencies,
performance increases [21]. This is a strategy cyber organizations should pursue.
Environment.
In line with the population ecology and resource dependence perspectives,
organizations that cannot adapt to their environment cannot survive [33].
Environmental contingencies are fundamentally important to organizations. They
are of particular importance to cyber organizations, which have a principal security
function. It is helpful to separate the internal environment of organizations from the
external environment of organizations. This research will exclusively focus on the
general external environment, here defined as the relevant physical and social
factors outside the boundaries of an organization [24] which generally eﬀect all
within the cyber‐connected critical infrastructure area. Limited research connecting
organizational structure to the cyberspace environment is available. However,
research is beginning to emerge on organizational operations in a cyber‐
environment. For example, Liu et al., [41] have addressed command and control in
cyber‐physical‐social systems (CPSS). However, Liu’s research focuses far more on
12

the potential capabilities of CPSS and far less on optimal structural dimensions for
those operating in cyberspace.
The presence of competition and hostility in the environment can
significantly affect organizations. For example, if an organization perceives their
environment to be hostile or competitive, it will move toward centralization and
formalization [34, 48]. This reaction may be instinctive. However, it can lead to a
structure that is ill‐suited to meet the challenging characteristics of the
environment. This phenomenon is insightful in light of newly created government
cyber organizations. It appears centralization and formalization are increasing in
these organizations conceivably to their peril.
Each organizational environment has unique extrinsic factors. These factors
influence organizational shape, means and actions within the environment [11]. In
assessing environmental considerations, uncertainty emerges as a focal point [11,
24, 39].

Environmental Uncertainty
Dynamism, complexity and munificence remain the primary dimensions used
to conceptualize the central properties of organization environments [7, 18, 25] and
act as significant measures of perceived uncertainty in the external environment [1,
24, 25]. These three dimensions relate to forces in the environment that can
influence the organization. Force is operationally defined as an entity external to
13

cyber‐connected critical infrastructure organizations that can eﬀect change in their
environment. These forces can be competitors, customers, economic, technological,
political, ethical, demographic, cultural and social [17, 24, 57]. Note that while
complexity, dynamism and munificence are capable of providing an extensive view
of the environment, they are not the only determinants of environmental eﬀects on
structure [31].
Complexity.
Complexity relates to the total amount of forces in the environment, whether
they are connecting with each other, and the degree by which they can influence
other organizations. For example, a weak force in isolation lowers uncertainty,
whereas many interconnecting strong forces increase uncertainty [2, 18, 24].
Dynamism (Turbulence).
Dynamism refers to change measured in speed and quantity. Organizations
that face a significant amount of change operate in environments that are more
uncertain. Organizations that experience small amounts of change have less
uncertainty. An increased rate or speed of change only adds to the uncertainty [2,
18, 24].
Munificence (Resource).
Munificence deals with capacity, or more generally, the amount of resources
available to sustain or support that environment. This category represents a
considerable portion of the focus of structural theory. As it pertains to uncertainty,
14

the scarcer the resources, the greater the uncertainty [2, 18, 47]. Figure 1
conceptually depicts munificence, complexity and dynamism as sources of
uncertainty in the external environment.

Figure 1. The External Environment and Uncertainty

Structures
The mechanistic and organic structural continuum represents the type of
forms organizations can take[11]. This continuum oﬀers two extremes for
management systems based on the level of perceived uncertainty in the
environment. Empirical results strongly indicate that perceived environmental
uncertainty significantly correlates with organic and mechanistic structural types.
Table 2 lists characteristics of the two structures.
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Table 2. Characteristics of Mechanistic and Organic Structures

Mechanistic
Specialized individual tasks
Vertical hierarchy
Individual responsibility
Centralized authority
Increased rules, policies and procedures
Standardized vertical communication
Directives and orders
Fixed functional departments
Status increases up hierarchy
Narrow span of control

Organic
Adjustable team tasks
Flexible (flatter) structure
Team responsibility
Decentralized authority
Decreased formalization
All‐encompassing communication
Advice and information sharing
Fluid (mixed) functional departments
Status increases with brilliance
Wide span of control

Mechanistic and Organic in Practice
Two organizations are used as examples to demonstrate mechanistic and
organic structures. The U.S. Army is used to typify mechanistic structures; Apache
Indians, Anonymous and Al Qaeda display examples of organic structures.
Mechanistic Organization: U.S. Army.
An Army infantry division represents an organization that displays
mechanistic characteristics. While not all of the Army trends toward mechanistic,
most of the Army easily fits this structure. A typical division is largely mechanistic
when analyzing its dimensional traits.
This particular type of structure is common throughout the Army regardless
of the environment and context in which it conducts business. Recent combat
operations in Iraq are an example. During the initial campaign, Army divisions were
deployed to dominate the environment with mass resources, against a singular,
16

weaker and mechanistic adversary. As the war matured and kinetic operations
diminished, the Army found its divisional structure ill‐suited for nation building, and
struggled to find the flexibility to adjust amidst the growing dynamics and
complexities (e.g., environmental uncertainty) of a counterinsurgency [4]. This
experience serves to highlight the need for flexible organizational modification
processes. Table 3 depicts the structural dimensions of a typical infantry division.

Table 3. U.S. Army Infantry Division Structure

Dimension
Specialization

Trait
Structure
Highly specialized down to the individual
Mechanistic
through task lists; highly functional and
compartmentalized into subunits.
Centralization
Authority to make decisions is often kept at
Mechanistic
multiple levels above the worker.
Formalization
Highly formalized tasks driven by doctrine,
Mechanistic
codified and checked frequently; dozens of
policies and procedures dictate actions.
Span of Control The amount of personnel supervised is
Mechanistic
doctrinally driven and rigid; often a narrow
and vertical hierarchy; diﬃcult to change.
Mechanistic
Chain of
Doctrinally driven and considerably vertical
Command
often with a dozen leaders with authority to
change what the lowest individual will do.
Mixed‐Organic
Professionalism Varied with deliberate intentions of being
high throughout the Army.
Status
Increases up the hierarchy.
Mechanistic
Communication More vertical than all encompassing; directive
Mechanistic
and orders based.
The means of creating an Army organization offers some explanation as to
why they are mechanistic.
17

Creating Mechanistic Organizations.
The Army creates organizations through the Force Development Process
which “consists of defining military capabilities, designing force structures to
provide these capabilities, and translating organizational concepts based on
doctrine, technologies, materiel, manpower requirements, and limited resources
into a trained and ready Army” [56].
There are five phases in the Force Development Process, and they are:
(1) Develop capabilities.
(2) Design organizations.
(3) Develop organizational models.
(4) Determine organizational authorizations.
(5) Document organizational authorizations.
Army organizations follow this process, to include Army cyber
organizations. This five‐step process results in the creation of an organizational
structure. Figure 3 shows the model of the system of systems process with the
inputs and outputs.

18

Figure 2. Army Force Development Process (AR 71‐32) [56]

Once the Army identifies the requirement for a new organization, the
planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) process begins to develop
the organization. The process map in Figure 4 highlights the key steps.

19

Recieve Guidance from...
•National Security Strategy, National Military
Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, National
Defense Strategy, Defense Planning Guidance,
Guidance for Development of the Force, Global
Force Management Implementation Guidance,
Guidance from the Army’s senior leadership (The
Army Plan), Joint warfighting concepts (such as
rapid decisive, operations, peace enforcement
operations), and/or new materiel capabilities
evolving from the research, development, and
acquisition process.

then...
•Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) utilizes the Army Capabilities
Integration Center (ARCIC) and proponent
centers and schools to develop and analyze
the design.

then..
•The capabilities development community
develops the proposed organization, designs,
missions, and functions to meet the required
operational capabilities, which is captured in
a Unit Reference Sheet (URS).

then...
•The approved URS design moves forward to ARCIC’s
Force Design Directorate and the Architecture
Integration and Management Division who makes
sure the proposed organizational design fits
throughout the Army and that the proposal is
doctrinally correct.

then...
•Force Design Directorate forwards their
design to the commanding general of
training and doctrine command for
approval.

then...
•Approved recommendations are forwarded to
Deputy Chief of Staff Director of Force
Managment for a force integration functional
areas analysis.

then...
•The Force design update needs to be
approved by the Vice Chief of Staff, Army or
Chief of Staff, Army.

then...
•The US Army Force Managment Support Agency,
in conjunction with the appropriate force
management proponent, applies architecture,
rules, standards, and guidance to the doctrinally
correct design to produce the organizational
model.

then...
•Headquarters Department of the Army
Approves the model known as a
Military Table of Orgranization and
Equipment.

then...
•The organization is submitted to the total army
analysis (TAA) process to compete for resources to
perform the specified capabilities it was created to do.
Resourcing varies.

Figure 3. Process Map for Creating Army Organizations
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The process map does not show all of the process. For instance, the Army will
still need to purchase equipment, requisition personnel, prep sites, and publish
doctrine. All of this happens within the confines of what has occurred previously.
This process does not happen quickly. Senior leader approval can cause bottlenecks
(there are many in this example), transitions from one organization to another,
rework, or additions/modifications from approving officials. Leaders often change,
which creates stagnation in the process. Several other factors and variables cause
delay to include embedded subprocesses. All of this adds up to an organizational
creation process facilitating mechanistic entities. Perhaps the most significant point
is that the Army evaluates structural context to determine needed capabilities, not
to determine structural strategy.
Organic Organizations: Apache Indians, Anonymous and Al Qaeda.
The Apache Indians, Anonymous Cyber Network, and Al Qaeda oﬀer
examples of organic structuring in a nearly pure form. These three organizations
exhibited an unusual ability to succeed against vastly larger adversaries; they
operate in highly uncertain environments, characterized by sudden and vast
amounts of change, considerable forces that are prone to shift at a moment’s notice,
and limited availability of resources. Table 4 depicts the structural dimensions of
these organizations.
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Table 4. Apache Indians, Anonymous Hacker Group and Al Qaeda Structures

Dimension
Specialization

Trait
Low level of specialization with operators
performing a broad range of random tasks
with little standardization; fluid team and
network‐based task units.
Centralization
Personnel follow emergent leaders and often
act with autonomy.
Formalization
Frequently no formalization is present in the
performance of tasks.
Span of Control Emergent and varied; at times extraordinarily
wide.
Chain of
Emergent and flexible based on contingencies
Command
facing subunits; near flat organizational
hierarchy with common themes allowing
various actors to plug into the organization
when needed or desired.
Professionalism Varied.
Status
Increases with displayed brilliance.
Communication Ranges from horizontal to all encompassing;
advice and information sharing.

Structure
Organic

Organic
Organic
Organic
Organic

Mixed
Organic
Organic

The Apache Indians have occupied what are now northern Mexico and the
southwestern United States for hundreds of years. They increased in fame and
notoriety during the era of Spanish Conquistadors in the Americas in the 16th
century. The Spanish appeared to be unstoppable as they gained considerable
ground throughout Central America until they ventured north and encountered the
Apache. The Spanish met their match in an undersized and under‐resourced
adversary [9].
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The anonymous hacker group is similar. They clashed with Fortune 500
companies, computer security firms, major religious organizations and brought
them, at least temporarily, great diﬃculty [44].
Al Qaeda has very noticeably kept powerful militaries busy for over a decade.
They have done so using simple technology and sneaky tactics to make up for their
lack of air support, advanced communications and weaponry. There is a
commonality in these three organizations and their adversaries. All of their
adversaries exhibited tendencies to structure and operate in a mechanistic fashion
despite external environmental conditions that suggest the opposite.
Creating Organic Organizations.
Describing the creation of these and other organic organizations is difficult;
they are, almost by definition, unstructured. However, Burns and Stalker highlight
the presence of three factors in the creation of organic structures: shared beliefs and
goals, commitment to a common concern, and personnel with expertise who emerge
as leaders [11]. Table 5 shows the presence of these factors.

Table 5. Structural Factors Present in Creating Organic Organizations

Organization
16th Century
Apache Indians
Anonymous
Hacker Group
Al Qaeda

Shared
beliefs/goals
Yes
Yes
Yes

Common concern

Emergent leaders

Repelling the Spanish
invasion
Varies on emergent
“operations” of interest
Repel the west;
establish a caliphate

Nant’ans
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Ops champion;
skilled hackers
Commanders/emirs

The strength of the factors appears to increase the strength of the
organization. When beliefs and goals begin to compete with one another, this can
create opposing factions, effectively reducing the collective power of the entity. A
common concern acts to focus the horizontal structure, which creates the impetus
for more skilled leaders to champion it. Weakening the common concern likewise
weakens the integration of existing groups. Followers choose leadership based on
proven effectiveness in the area of interest. The absence of skilled leaders hinders
the ability of the organization to accomplish goals. In the case of the Apache, leaders
are known as Nant’ans, spiritual and cultural front‐runners people liked following
[9]. There were many Nant’ans, and they would at times align with each other when
needed. When one died, another would emerge. Figure 5 is a depiction of horizontal
and network‐based nature of the Apache Indians in the 16th century:

Nant’an

Nant’an
Nant’an

Nant’an

Figure 4. Apache Structural Depiction
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Structure and Environmental Uncertainty Synthesis
As it relates to performance, the greater the perceived uncertainty in the
environment, the more the organization should take an organic form, and with less
uncertainty, they undertake a mechanistic form [11, 29, 39]. When an organization
takes an organic form in an environment that is highly uncertain, this is considered
a structural fit, which is shown to increase performance [21]. This alignment seems
intuitive, as organic structures are more fluid and adaptable. Following the same
logic, organic structures are not as helpful in stable environments. It is worth noting
that no single contingency or structure applies to all. Organic or mechanistic
structural types are only “better” if they fit the contingencies. Organizational
structures and their relationship to environmental uncertainty and structural
contingency can be synthesized as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 5: Organizational Structure, Uncertainty and the External Environment

This research seeks to find out the level of uncertainty in the general external
environment of cyber connected critical infrastructure to determine structural
guidance for cyber organizations tasked with protecting these critical assets.
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III. Methodology
Research Design and Methodology
The research method is a multiple case study. The approach is structured as
an exploratory study with a retrospective lens for organizational patterns. The case
study method allows investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful
characteristics of real‐life events such as individual life cycles, small group behavior,
organizational and managerial processes and the maturation of industries [60].
The data analysis technique is content analysis. Content analysis is suitable
for condensing many words within a document into a small set of content categories
based on explicit coding rules for the purpose of examining them [6, 30, 37, 54]. The
content categories were established a priori based the organizational structure
theories of population ecology, resource dependence and structural contingency.
The categories were defined iteratively to maximize mutual exclusivity and
exhaustiveness [58]. This research highlights external environmental uncertainty
for its significant influence in shaping organizational structure across the following
three measured dimensional categories: (i) complexity; (ii) dynamism (turbulence);
and, (iii) munificence (resource) [18].

Data Collection
Once external environmental uncertainty was chosen as the focus of this
research, the content analyst was able to draw a stratified purposive sample of
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artifacts (documents) from the published material. The strata (cases) divided into
academia, government and private/practitioner [43, 46]. Each represents
stakeholders of publicly available information related to critical infrastructure and
cyber in the United States. Information about the cyber linkage to critical
infrastructure is a specific topic of interest where relevant information is known
mostly to a specific subset of professionals within these three strata [37]. Search
engines (including Google, RAND/CSIS/MITRE and .gov sources) identified the
artifacts using algorithms that sort document retrieval from large databases. This
process helps to identify artifacts with the most references and information related
to critical infrastructure and cyber. The U.S. Government Accountability Oﬃce’s
(GAO) definition of artifacts as physically separable, minimally sized, and self‐
contained textual information was adopted [30].
Artifact Discrimination.
Artifacts were retrieved using the search terms industrial control system,
SCADA, and critical infrastructure cyber, based on their close linkage to cyber‐
connected critical infrastructure [8]. The initial search harvested a large number of
artifacts. In filtering the results, additional criteria were applied to achieve a
relevant and representative sample for each stratum. Table 6 lists the criteria. The
content analyst converted the final selection of artifacts (Appendix A) into
individual portable document format (PDF) to minimize the file size, standardize the
format for all coders, and make importing into coding software (e.g., Maxqda) easy.
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Table 6. Artifact Criteria

Category
Content
Geography
Timeliness
Availability
Size

Criteria
Discuss cyber and the critical infrastructure general
external environment
U.S. related
Published within the last seven years (since July 2008)
Publicly available
No more than 20 codeable pages per document

Table 7 contains the search results. More artifacts that are academic were
reviewed because of their perceived reliability, validity and trust. A slightly higher
amount of private/practitioner artifacts were reviewed than government because of
search engine limitations unique to RAND, CSIS and MITRE. Google’s platform
dominated by its ability to return results concentrated on the focus area, which was
very timely (usually within one year of publication). Government artifact selection
also suﬀered from search engine limitations and syntactic issues (e.g., included only
minutes from congressional meetings) that increased the amount of artifacts needed
to be viewed.

Table 7. Artifact Retrieval Results

Strata
Academia
Private/ Practitioner
Government
Totals

Initial Sample
91
73
65
229

Met Criteria
34
17
17
68

Final Random Sample
10 (50%)
5 (25%)
5 (25%)
20 (n=60)

Artifacts were randomized using Microsoft Excel to generate the final sample.
All 68 artifacts (Appendix B) meeting the selection criterion were coded with an A,
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P, G (academic, private/practitioner, and government). The final random sample
contained 20 documents per coder (distributed 10‐A/5‐P/5‐G) for a total of n=60
documents. It is important to note that in content analysis, unlike quantitative
statistical analysis, an accurate representation of all the documents in the area of
cyber‐connected critical infrastructure is not the goal. The goal is to retrieve a useful
set of artifacts to answer the research question fairly [37].
Organizational Diversity.
The documents analyzed by the coders represented a diverse amount of
information from all three strata. Parent organizations that have published content
included in the final sample are: Association for Computing Machinery, IEEE, Forbes,
Army Research Lab, International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection,
Economist, Tripwire, Department of Homeland Security, Institute for Computer
Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, White House,
Government Accountability Oﬃce, Dow Jones and Co., and International Federation
for Information Processing.

Coding
Krippendorf defines coding as the step of classifying the sampling or
recording units in terms of the categories of the analytical constructs chosen [37].
The sampling unit elected to categorize the information present in the artifact is
“the sentence” [54], because of its ability to obtain meaning in relation to text [37],
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and due to the use of human coders [30]. Each sentence was read and coded against
the code categories using the recording unit classification diagram listed in
Appendix C. Coders were trained to look for repetitive material so as not to code the
same information twice. The coders were instructed to interpret the sampling unit
(e.g., sentence) in the context of an entire artifact (e.g., context unit). This
interpretation is meaningful and feasible for an artifact that contains less than eight
pages of codeable material [37]. An example of a coded artifact is in Appendix D.
Content Categories.
The Maxqda graphical user interface provides a visual display of code
categories and coded material to check operational definitions against sampling
units, as displayed in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Maxqda Graphical User Interface
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The “Not Applicable” code category was included in addition to the existing a
priori categories of complexity, dynamism and munificence to ensure
exhaustiveness [30, 54]. All forces discussed relate to the general external
environment. Table 8 lists the code categories.

Table 8. Code Category Definitions

Code Category
Complexity
Complexity
Complexity
Complexity
Complexity
Complexity
Dynamism
Dynamism
Dynamism
Dynamism
Munificence
Munificence
Not Applicable

Sub Category
Forces interconnecting

Definitions
Are the forces interconnecting?
(CONNECTEDNESS)
Forces not connecting
Are the forces disconnected?
(CONNECTEDNESS)
Many forces
Are the forces many? (AMOUNT)
Few forces
Are the forces few? (AMOUNT)
Forces are strong
Are the forces strong?
(STRENGTH)
Forces are weak
Are the forces weak?
(STRENGTH)
Forces change a lot
Is there a high amount of change?
(AMOUNT)
Forces change infrequently Are forces changing very little?
(AMOUNT)
Forces change fast
Is change happening quickly?
(SPEED)
Forces change slowly
Is change happening slowly?
(SPEED)
Resources are scarce
Are the amount of resources
available scarce? (AMOUNT)
Resources are in
Are the amount of resources
abundance
available abundant? (AMOUNT)
Not Applicable
All other sentences (N/A)
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Coder Training.
Qualitative data analysis software (Maxqda) was selected for the ability to
manage large volumes of text, display information with ease and for working with
multiple coders [52]. The content analyst familiarized the coders with Maxqda,
operational definitions and code categories (see Appendix E). Also, well‐defined
explicit coding instructions were written into Maxqda to improve coding
consistency [54]. Only the content analyst trained and evaluated each coder [37].
They participated in a beta coding session to improve coding consistency and to
minimize idiosyncratic judgments in the coding process [37]. The training process
produced favorable reliability results. The coders trained on documents not
included in the final sample. No collaboration amongst the coders was allowed
during the coding process.
Three graduate students with a strong background in cyber coded the
documents. The importance of coders being familiar with the phenomena under
consideration was a critical factor in coder selection [37]. The reading level of the
documents demanded coders with a higher education level.

Data Reduction
Once the coders finished, the completed thumb drives were given to the
content analyst to aggregate. The combined data sets generated numerous
descriptive statistics, charts, and tables. The content analyst scrutinized the data for
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outliers, incomplete artifacts, and other anomalies. All of the artifacts were deemed
complete and properly coded. The data were imported into Microsoft Excel to look
for analysis of patterns and trends within and across the set. Numerous graphs and
tables were collapsed into a tight set which best articulated the findings.

Validity
Every step of the research process was conducted to ensure the quality of the
results led to an acceptance of truth. The guidelines set forth by Klaus Krippendorﬀ
[37] for validity in content analysis were followed and reviewed periodically
throughout the research process.

Reliability
To ensure valid inferences from the text, word meaning and category
definitions were tightened, multiple coders were used and intercoder agreement
was calculated. Cohens Kappa [14] was calculated as a measure of reliability. It is
considered a strict measure of agreement between coders based on the selection of
a particular code for the recording unit [42].
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IV. Analysis and Results
Descriptive Statistics
Table 9 shows the coding units range from 1,594 to 2,067 (mean=1,838). The
primary reason for this variance lies in how each coder interpreted the coding unit.
The ambiguity of the language in the published material might cause one coder to
perceive the presence of a coding unit while another did not.
Table 9. Total Codes by Coder

1
Pages
156
Documents
20
Coding units 2067

Coder
2
3
156
156
20
20
1853 1594

Table 10 shows that each coder read 156 pages, which averaged 7.8 pages
per artifact. Although there were more academic artifacts than government, the
government artifacts averaged more pages (13.8). Subsequently, the diﬃculty of
interpreting the sampling unit (sentence) in relation to the context unit (artifact)
increased [37].

Table 10. Pages Coded by Strata

Pages Read
Pages Per Artifact

Academic
74
7.4

Government
69
13.8
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Private/Practitioner Aggregate
13
156
2.6
7.8

Flesch‐Kincaid Reading Level and Flesch Reading Ease measures were
calculated for each artifact. Table 11 shows the results. The Flesch‐Kincaid formulas
are mathematical derivations accounting for the amount of words in a sentence and
syllables per word to generate a grade level guide for comprehension and ease of
reading [26, 35]. The total pages coded were 156, with an average 1,838 recordable
units at a graduate reading level and ease (Flesch‐Kincaid Grade 16/Ease 23). The
government documents emerged as the most diﬃcult to comprehend based on
these indices and suﬀered the highest amount of disagreement.
Table 11. Flesch‐Kincaid Reading Scores

Strata
Academic
Government
Private/Practitioner
Total Average

Reading Level
16
17
16
16

Reading Ease
24
15
27
23

Intercoder Agreement
Based on Landis and Koch [38], the coder agreement in Table 12 ranges from
fair (21%‐40%) to substantial (61%‐80%) which results in moderate overall
agreement with Kappa ranging from 51%‐60%. Several factors can aﬀect Kappa
(e.g., amount of categories (13), specificity of definition); since the research is
exploratory, lower levels of agreement are considered acceptable [42]. Coders were
allowed considerable latitude in content interpretation based on their expertise and
training. Despite challenges, the results indicate agreement between coders.
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Table 12. Cohens Kappa

Academic
Government
Private/Practitioner
Kappa

Coders
1 and 3
0.71
0.47
0.51
0.60

1 and 2
0.66
0.39
0.36
0.52

2 and 3
0.71
0.29
0.31
0.51

Mean
0.69
0.38
0.40
0.54

Code Distribution
Table 13 lists the frequency distribution of codes across the sample (n=60).
The coders assigned a dimensional code to 51.8% of the content (2,856 sentences).
The category “not applicable” was removed from the frequency analysis in Table 13
to remove bias. The frequency analysis indicates that complexity has a strong
presence (more than 91%) in each stratum. Complexity (e.g., forces connecting,
many forces, forces are strong) accounts for 67.43% of uncertainty in the content
coded. Dynamism (e.g., amount of change is high, forces change fast) accounts for
8.12% of uncertainty in the content coded. Munificence (e.g., resources are scarce)
accounts for 5.85% of uncertainty in the content coded. Based on coder
interpretation, as Figure 7 indicates, there is a strong presence (81.4%) of
uncertainty in the general external environment present across the three strata
sampled.
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Table 13. Frequency Analysis of Codes

Parent code
Complexity
Complexity
Complexity
Munificence
Munificence
Dynamism
Complexity
Dynamism
Dynamism
Complexity
Dynamism
Complexity

Code
Forces Connecting
Many Forces
Forces are Strong
Resources are in Abundance
Resources are Scarce
Amount of Change is High
Forces Not Connecting
Forces Change Fast
Forces Change Slowly
Forces are Weak
Amount of Change is Low
Few Forces
Total

Frequency
872
537
517
225
167
144
140
88
65
57
34
10
2,856

Percent
30.53
18.80
18.10
7.88
5.85
5.04
4.90
3.08
2.28
2.00
1.19
0.35
100.00

Figure 7. Uncertainty in the General External Environment
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Documents
56
55
58
36
44
44
32
25
20
29
11
8
‐

Strata Analysis
The following sections will provide an analysis of the presence of uncertainty
in the general external environment, within and across strata, displayed in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Percentage of Uncertainty by Dimension and Strata

Complexity.
Figure 8 illustrates there is strong evidence to support that complexity is
extremely high. All three strata showed a strong presence of complexity in the
general external environment. In fact, the data appears to be a statistical dead‐heat
at about 90%.
Dynamism.
Dynamism presents a diﬀerent picture. Private/practitioner displays
significantly higher uncertainty than government and academic strata. This level of
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uncertainty appears to be reasonable because of the increased competition and
desire for revenue present in the private/practitioner environment. This
environment requires the ability to dissolve or create organizations rapidly, modify
processes, and innovate in response to market stimuli.
The government strata exhibit a lower presence of uncertainty. Unlike
private/practitioner, government functions are slow to change. Despite this, coders
agree there is vastly more change (dynamism) in the general external environment
across all three strata. In fact, the amount of change was detected at four times the
frequency (see Table 13).
Munificence.
It is clear from the results there is explanatory power and a measurable
degree of resource scarcity (munificence) in the environment. The presence of
uncertainty is lower overall across all three environmental resource measures.
However, the academic strata exhibit significantly more perceived resource scarcity
in the general external environment. A reasonable explanation for the diﬀerence is
the breadth and depth of research the academic sector dedicates to this complex
area.

39

Coder Analysis
Figure 9 clearly demonstrates the coders were consistent in their coding
across all three dimensions of uncertainty. While there is slight disagreement in
munificence (resource) and complexity (amount/connectedness of forces), there is
general agreement overall.

Figure 9. Coder Overlap

Recommendations for Action
Understanding the outcomes presented in this study, it would be logical to
structure government cyber organizations operating in the critical infrastructure
environment in an organic fashion rather than the current mechanistic structure.
The government should generate separate processes in the creation of these
40

organizations to allow for fast implementation and frequent modification. These
cyber organizations should have the following characteristics if they are to succeed:


People do not perform highly specialized tasks but have a broader view.



A chain of command exists but is more decentralized because of the need for
shifting responsibilities.



The high level of complexity and change in the environment warrants
knowledgeable personnel working in teams and coordinating frequently to
make fast decisions when needed.



Communication often occurs and at many levels.



Orders and directives diminish as advice and information sharing increase.



Knowledge and expertise increase individual status.

One of the most appealing aspects of the research is the potential for
generalizability to other cyber organizations operating within the United States and
similarly developed countries. One could make the argument that the cyber
environments of the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense,
private utility companies, and high technology firms have significant similarities.
It is worth mentioning that significant barriers exist to implementing these
principles in the DoD and other government agencies ranging from culture to
strategic direction. Understanding the connections between organizational
performance, structure, and the environment should act as an impetus for these
difficult changes.
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V. Conclusions
Conclusions of Research
Few topics within the area of national interest are more important than the
understanding of how to organize in cyber and protect national critical
infrastructure assets from cyberspace threats. Participation at the United States
Army Cyber Talks at the National Defense University in September of 2015 served
to strengthen the need for empirical analysis and evidence that could lead to
organizational structuring decisions and adjustments. Innovation and knowledge
management were direct concerns of attendees, which relate directly to
organizational structure [40]. Several structural dimensions were repeatedly
discussed as inhibitors to performance further validating the need for this research.
The three research questions answered in this study were:
1. What is organizational structure?
Answer: The research literature depicts organizational structure in two
dimensions: structural and contextual. The contextual dimensions
significantly affect the structural dimensions.
2. What theories contribute to organizational structure?
Answer: Institutional isomorphism, resource dependence, population
ecology, and structural contingency are dominant organizational theories
that contribute to the explanation of organizational structure. Of these
four theories, structural contingency provides a pragmatic explanation of
how to structure organizations based on context and contingency. The
environment emerges as a prominent point of focus in every dominant
theory. The level of uncertainty with regard to the organization's general
external environment shows a strong connection to structural type.
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3. How should organizations structure in cyber environments to defend
critical infrastructure?
Answer: The perceived level of uncertainty, as measured by the degree of
complexity, dynamism, and munificence in the external environment of
cyber organizations relates well to the mechanistic and organic structural
continuum. Cyber organizations should structure organically in highly
uncertain environments and mechanistically in less uncertain
environments.

As it pertains to the cyber‐connected critical infrastructure environment,
forces within and across strata are overwhelmingly numerous, strong and
connecting. The amount of change at present is very high. The speed of change is
fast and resources are typified by an abundance of information technology with low
barriers to entry creating opportunity and availability for adversary and ally alike.
These elements create the perception of a highly uncertain situation for
organizations operating in the cyber‐connected critical infrastructure environment.
Organic structuring principles allow for the adaptability and flexibility this
environment requires. This research indicates organizations should follow organic
structuring principles while operating in the cyber‐connected critical infrastructure
environment.
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Recommendations for Future Research
Measure Government Cyber Organizations.
This research approached answering the question of how to structure
organizations in cyberspace by first analyzing the contextual dimension of external
environmental uncertainty. It will now be appropriate and helpful to measure
empirically structural dimensions of government cyber organizations (e.g., DHS ICS‐
CERT, USCYBERCOM), to contribute further to the answer.
Replicate the Study.
This research focused on the U.S. only. However the U.S. is not the only
country in need of strategic direction in the creation of cyber organizations tasked
to protect critical infrastructure. A replicative study for other allied nations who
mutually support cyber alongside the U.S. (Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and New
Zealand), would contribute to the overall security of each nation.
Identify Dominant Factors for Munificence.
Munificence (resource) in this research is broadly defined. With the insight
gained from this study, it is apparent that resource in cyber would benefit from
structural equation modeling (e.g., confirmatory factor analysis). This research will
aid in the identification of dominant resource factors in the cyber‐connected critical
infrastructure environment.
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Appendix A. Artifact Final Selection (Front Page Information)
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Appendix B. Artifacts Meeting Selection Criteria
A A Survey of SCADA and Critical Infrastructure Incidents
A A Taxonomy of Cyber Attacks on SCADA Systems
A A Web‐Based Remote Lab for SCADA
A Advanced Key for Secure SCADA
A Capabilities of Dynamic Reconfiguration MB ICS
A CI Dependency Assessment
A Creating a Cyber Moving Target for CI
A Critical Infrastructure Dependencies
A Cyber CI Protect Payload Anomaly Detection
A Cyber Security Risk Assessment for SCADA and DCS Networks 2007 ISA Transactions
A Decentralized Risk Management CI
A Detecting Intrusions in SCADA Systems
A Event Triggered Strat IC S
A FPGAs in Industrial Control Applications
A GSM SMS Based Monitoring Control Systems
A Improving Security for SCADA Control Systems
A Intrusion Detection in SCADA
A Methodologies and Applications for CI
A Network Intrusion Detection M0DBUS ICS
A Networked Control System Overview and Research Trends
A Probabilistic Risk in CI
A Public Private CI
A Rethinking Security Properties SCADA
A SCADA Security in Light of Cyber Warfare
A SCADA Testbed
A Security lssues in SCADA Networks
A Security Retrofit for SCADA
A Security Strategies for SCADA Networks
A State of the Art in CI Protection
A Stealthy Deception Attacks on Water SCADA Systems
A The Cyber Threat Landscape Challenges and Future Research Directions Computers Security
A The SCADA Challenge Securing Critical Infrastructure 2009 Network Security
A Wind Turbines SCADA
A Winn Honeypots
P Americas CI is vulnerable to Cyber Forbes
P Automation World scada‐attacks‐double‐2014
P Crashing the System CI The Economist
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P Critical Infrastructure Security Vulnerability Tripwire
P CSIS Insuring ICS Security
P Cyberattacks Escalate CI Homeland Sec Today
P DHS Phishing CI The Hill
P In the Crossfire
P McAfee In the Dark Private CI View
P McAfee on CI General
P Protecting the Nations CI from Cyber
P SANS ICS CI Response
P Study Half of CI pros Attack SC Magazine
P Survey Reveals CI Issues
P Trend Micro‐ Report on Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure in the Americas
P Verizon Data Breach
P Verizon Energy CI
G Army Research Lab ICS Security
G CI Assessment Smart Grid Security
G Cyber Threats from CRI Protecting CI
G DHS IG Secure ICS
G DHS Strategy for Securing Control Systems
G DHS Year End Assessment
G Executive Order Improving CI Cybersecurity
G GAO CI Protect Observations
G GAO Maritime CI Protection
G GAO‐15‐290, High‐Risk Series CI
G ICS Summary Report
G Identifying, Understanding, and Analyzing CI Interdepend
G NIST cybersecurity framework
G NIST Guide to ICS Security 2008
G NIST Guide to Industrial Control Systems Security 2011
G PPD CI Security
G Presidential Cyberspace Policy Review

66

Appendix C. Recording Unit Classification Diagram
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Appendix D. Coded Artifact Example
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Appendix E. Coder Training Briefing
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